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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Natu re of the Case
Officer Timothy Arredondo illegally engaged in a warrantless search of Brent
Tyler by reaching under two layers of Mr. Tyler's clothing to feel the right pocket of
his shirt.

This search was not justified under any of the well-established and well-

delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement, particularly, consent and stop-andfrisk (a.k.a. the Terry exception).1 The district court applied the proper legal standards
and found that the search exceeded the scope of both Mr. Tyler's consent and the Terry
exception. As such, the search violated Mr. Tyler's state and federal rights to be free of
unreasonable warrantless searches.

Therefore, the district court granted Mr. Tyler's

motion to suppress. The State appealed. As the district court's decision was correct, it
should be affirmed.

1 Referring to the United States Supreme Court's decision which permits limited frisks
of suspects for weapons based upon reasonable suspicion that they are armed and
presently dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Arredondo, a member of the Twin Falls Police Department, was notified
by other officers in an unmarked cruiser that they had seen a vehicle commit a
traffic infraction and they requested that he make a traffic stop of that vehicle. 2 (Tr., p.6,
L.10 - p.?, L.12.)

He "just assumed that [the unmarked officers] had followed [the

suspect's car] directly from the known drug house." (Tr., p.9, Ls.1?-19.) He was not,
however, a part of the unmarked officers' narcotics interdiction team on that occasion.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.?-B.) Nevertheless, he proceeded to stop the vehicle they had identified.
(Tr., p.B, Ls.14-16.)

He was subsequently joined by three other officers.

(Tr., p.10,

Ls.B-9.) He also left his overhead lights on throughout the encounter. (Tr., p.24, Ls.111.)
Having recognized the driver of the vehicle as a felony probationer, Officer
Arredondo requested the driver exit the vehicle and performed a full search of that
person, which included going through his pockets.

(Tr., p.11, Ls.14-1B.) The officer

explained that he believed a full search was appropriate as "people on supervised
probation sign over their Fourth Amendment rights to search and seizure." (Tr., p.11,
Ls.1-4.) His search of the driver did not, however, reveal any contraband. (Tr., p.11,
Ls.19-21.)

Regardless, Officer Arredondo decided to search the vehicle as well.

(Tr., p.12, Ls.13-15.) As a result, he requested Mr. Tyler, who was a passenger in the
vehicle, get out of the car. (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-1B.)

The reasonable suspicion for the stop itself was not challenged below.
Ls.20-22.)

2

2

(Tr., p.?,

As Mr. Tyler exited the car, Officer Arredondo asked if he had any weapons on
his person.

(Tr., p.12, Ls.20-21.)

Mr. Tyler began to answer in the negative, but

immediately corrected himself and informed the officer that he did, in fact, have an
"X-Acto" knife in his left shirt pocket. (Tr., p.46, L.24 - p.47, L.6, p.25, Ls.11-13.) The
shirt with the knife in it was underneath two jackets. 3 (Tr., p.36, Ls.1-5.) Mr. Tyler had
to move his jackets so that the officer would be able to see the knife in his left shirt
pocket.

(Tr., p.36, Ls.9-12.)

in Mr. Tyler's pocket.

The officer was then able to see the knife clearly

(Tr., p.26, Ls.2-6.)

However, he could not see anything in

Mr. Tyler's right shirt pocket, nor was there anything (such as a bulge) which drew his
attention to the right pocket.

(Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.3.)

Nervous because of the

situation in which he found himself, Mr. Tyler attempted to retrieve the knife and
surrender it to the officer in the spirit of cooperation. 4 (Tr., p.36, Ls.15-19.)
Officer Arredondo ordered him to stop reaching for the knife. (Tr., p.30, Ls.4-7.)
He then dealt with Mr. Tyler in the same manner as he had the driver as he went to
secure the knife. (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-10.) This meant that Mr. Tyler's hands were behind
him, fingers interlaced, and under the officer's control. (Tr., p.14, Ls.1 0-12.) The officer
proceeded to remove the knife from Mr. Tyler's left shirt pocket. (Tr., p.14, Ls.13-15.)
Then, Officer Arredondo asked Mr. Tyler if he minded being patted down. (Tr., p.36,
L.25 - p.37, L.11, p.51, Ls.14-15.) Mr. Tyler responded "A Terry search is fine, but I'm
not going to give you permission to dig through my pockets." (Tr., p.39, Ls.10-12.) The
officer agreed to those conditions and began the search. (Tr., p.14, Ls.4-9.)

3 The fact that Mr. Tyler was wearing so many layers of clothing is unremarkable, as it
was appropriate given weather conditions. (See R., p.105.)
4 He later recognized that was a foolish thing to do. (Tr., p.26, Ls.15-19.)
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However, before patting down any other part of Mr. Tyler's clothes, Officer
Arredondo immediately moved his hand to Mr. Tyler's right shirt pocket.

(Tr., p.15,

Ls.3-17.) He admitted that "[m]y hand was under the jacket." (Tr., p.31, Ls.3-4.) He felt
a syringe in that pocket. (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9.) He detained Mr. Tyler and then removed
the syringe from the right shirt pocket. (Tr., p.18, Ls.13-15.) Officer Arredondo believed
that the clear liquid in the syringe was methamphetamine. (Tr., p.18, Ls.22-25.) At that
point, the officer placed Mr. Tyler in custody, conducted a full search of Mr. Tyler, and
found a bag of white crystal substance, which he believed to be methamphetamine.
(R., p.10; Tr., p.19, Ls.6-10.)

As a result, Mr. Tyler was charged with possession of methamphetamine.
(R., pp.33-34.)

Mr. Tyler subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence and

dismiss the charges, based on "all relevant United States and Idaho Constitutional law
and case law."

(R., pp.104-111.)

The district court, upon hearing the evidence,

made certain findings of fact, which included that, by consenting to a Terry search,
Mr. Tyler had only consented to a pat down of his outer clothing. (Tr., p.51, Ls.10-22.)
This was consistent, in the district court's opinion, with controlling and persuasive
precedent interpreting the scope of the Terry search exception to the warrant
requirement. (Tr., p.51, L.22 - p.52, L.24.) As a result, it found that, by placing his hand
under both of Mr. Tyler's jackets to feel the right shirt pocket, Officer Arredondo had
exceeded both the scope of Mr. Tyler's consent to search and the scope of the Terry
search exception to the warrant requirement.

(See Tr., p.51, L.10 - p.53, L.25.) As

such, it granted Mr. Tyler's motion to suppress. (Tr., p.54, Ls.2-3; R., p.131.) The State
timely appealed from that order. (R., pp.135-137.)

4

The State argued in its Appellant's Brief that Officer Arredondo's search was
permissible because Mr. Tyler consented to a Terry search and the officer's actions
were reasonable as part of a Terry search. (App. Br., pp.6-12.) However, the district
court's determinations - that Terry searches are reasonably understood to be only a pat
down of the outer clothing; that, having removed the weapon from Mr. Tyler's pocket,
there was no longer reasonable suspicion for Officer Arredondo to exceed that
limitation; and that the search was, therefore, illegal - are supported by the record and
consistent with both state and federal precedent.
affirmed by this Court. (See Tr., p.51, L.10 - p.54, L.3.)

5

Therefore, its ruling should be

ISSUE

Whether the district court properly suppressed the evidence found during the illegal
warrantless search because, on these facts, none of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement permitted the officer to put his hand underneath Mr. Tyler's outer layer of
clothing.

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Suppressed The Evidence Found During The Illegal
Warrantless Search Because, On These Facts, None Of The Exceptions To The
Warrant Requirement Permitted The Officer To Put His Hand Underneath Mr. Tyler's
Outer Layer Of Clothing

A.

Introduction
The district court applied the proper standard to these facts and correctly held

that Officer Arredondo's decision to put his hand under Mr. Tyler's outer layer of clothing
violated Mr. Tyler's Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 17 rights against unreasonable
warrantless searches. His actions were beyond the limited scope of Mr. Tyler's consent
and the Terry exception to the warrant requirement because, based on the facts of this
case, neither permitted more than a pat down of Mr. Tyler's outer layer of clothing.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's decision to suppress the
evidence seized as the result of the illegal search.

B.

Officer Arredondo's Search Violated Mr. Tyler's State And Federal Constitutional
Rights Against Unreasonable Searches
Mr. Tyler moved the district court to suppress the evidence in this case based on

"all relevant United States and Idaho Constitutional law and case law." (R., p.104.) The
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. John Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,
524 (1986).

The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against

7

unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 17; State v. Donato, 135
Idaho 469,471 (2001).
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has declared that warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable.

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).

Therefore, a warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless
the State demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and we 11delineated exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts. Id. at 390-91; see
also State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies

to Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution).

In this case, the State attempts to use the

consent exception and the Terry exception to justify Officer Arredondo's warrantless
search of Mr. Tyler's clothing, notably, the right pocket of his shirt which was under both
a "zip-up hoodie jacket" and a second, outer jacket. (See Tr., p.36, Ls.1-2.) Neither
exception is applicable in this case, and the district court properly suppressed the
evidence found as a result of that illegal search, as the search which led to the
discovery of all the evidence violated Mr. Tyler's Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 17
constitutional protections.

While both Art. 1, § 17 and the Fourth Amendment serve similar purposes, Idaho
courts are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment when interpreting the scope of Art. 1, § 17. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho
469, 471 (2001). Rather, the federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence sets a floor
for protections, and while the state may have an interest in conforming with that
jurisprudence, Idaho is free to find that Art. 1, § 17 provides more protection than the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
5
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1.

Because Mr. Tyler Limited His Consent To A Pat Down Of His Outer Layer
Of Clothing And The Officer's Search Exceeded The Scope Of That
Consent, The Consent Exception Does Not Justify The Warrantless
Search

Voluntary consent to a search given by the suspect is one of the well-established
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973); State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 153 (Ct. App. 2004).

The suspect may,

however, limit the scope of his consent, and thus the scope of the permissible search.
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1980); Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 154. The
searching officer must adhere to the limitations placed on the consent; going beyond
constitutes a violation of the suspect's rights under both the state and federal
constitutions. Walter, 447 U.S. at 656-57; Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 151. The scope of the
limitation is based on what a reasonable person would understand the limitation to be,
based on the exchange between the suspect and the officer which led to the grant of
consent. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 154.
The district court made a finding of fact in this regard: By saying, "a Terry search
is fine, but I'm not going to give you permission to dig through my pockets," (Tr., p.47,
L.25 - p.48, L.2), the district court found that Mr. Tyler had limited the scope of his
consent. (Tr., p.51, Ls.10-17.) Because Mr. Tyler had expressly excluded a search into
the interior of his clothes, the scope of his consent was for just a pat down of the
exterior layer of his clothing. (See Tr., p.51, Ls.10-17.) Mr. Tyler confirmed that this
was his understanding of the extent of a Terry search, and, accordingly, had intended to
limit the scope of his consent to just the outer layer of his clothing. (Tr., p.37, Ls.7-11.)
The district court determined that a reasonable person would have understood that
Mr. Tyler had, in fact, limited the scope of his consent to a pat down of the outer layer of
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his clothing. (See Tr., p.51, Ls.14-22.) Appellate courts defer to the factual findings of
the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. 6 State v. Oiaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302
(2007). Because that finding was not clearly erroneous, this Court should defer to that
finding. See id.; Stewart, 145 Idaho at 649. And because Officer Arredondo's search
extended beyond a pat down of Mr. Tyler's outer layer of clothing,7 the consent
exception does not justify the warrantless search.

2.

Precedent Is Clear That A Terry Search Is Limited To A Pat Down Of Only
The Outer Layer Of Clothing, And Since Officer Arredondo Reached
Under Two Layers Of Mr. Tyler's Clothing, His Search Exceeded The
Scope Of A Permissible Terry Search, And So That Exception Does Not
Justify The Warrantless Search

When it established the Terry exception to the warrant requirement, the United
States Supreme Court approved of the following actions by the officer:

"Officer

McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and his two companions. He did
not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he
had felt the weapons, and then merely reached for and removed the guns." Terry, 392
U.S. at 29-30 (emphasis added). Of particular note is the fact that the Supreme Court
specifically recognized that the officer did not extend his search beyond the outer layer

The record itself does not indicate that this finding is clearly erroneous, as the district
court considered the testimony of both witnesses and the audio recording to understand
the exchange and determine what a reasonable person would have understood as a
result of that exchange. (See Tr., p.51, Ls.14-22.) Even if there is some dispute about
the facts, as long as the findings and inferences may reasonably be drawn from the
evidence, the appellate courts defer to those findings. State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641,
649 (2008).
7 Officer Arredondo admitted under oath that "[m]y hand was under the jacket."
(Tr., p.31, Ls.3-4.)
6
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of clothing until after he had felt the weapon through the outer layer of clothing. 8 Id.
The district court properly recognized this clear limitation to the Terry exception and
relied on it to grant the motion to suppress. (Tr., p.53, Ls.6-9.) Based on a reading of
Terry alone, the district court's ruling is revealed to be correct, and this Court should

affirm it.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has continued to recognize that
Terry searches are less than full searches, and must be limited accordingly.

United

States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228 (1973); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,

303 (1999); see also State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 661 (2007) (the Idaho Supreme
Court also recognizing that Terry searches must be "carefully limited").

The State,

however, erroneously argued that the scope of the frisk is broad enough so as to be
'''reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for
the assault of the police officer.",g (App. Br., p.7 (quoting Terry, 392, U.S. at 29).) The
reason why the State is incorrect and that Terry searches must be limited is: '''Even a
limited search of the outer clothing ... constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon

8 In Terry, the officer patted down the exterior of Mr. Terry's overcoat and located the
gun in the breast pocket of the overcoat. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. The officer was not
permitted to reach into that pocket (i.e., under the outer layer of the outer jacket) until he
had felt the weapon through the outer layer of clothing. Id. at 29-30. Therefore,
reaching inside, or under, the suspect's outer jacket without having first felt the
offending object through the outer coat is beyond the scope of the Terry exception.
See id.
9 Evidencing the impropriety of the State's position - that the Terry exception should be
read broadly so as to allow extensive searches of suspects' inner layers of clothing the Terry Court immediately follows the sentence which the State quoted with the
recognition that the scope of such searches is limited to the pat down of the outer
clothing, and only if the officer detects a weapon underneath the outer clothing may the
search become more expansive. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30. Since Officer
Arredondo did not begin with a pat down of the outer layer of clothing, his more
extensive search of the inner layer of Mr. Tyler's clothing was beyond the scope of the
Terry exception.
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cherished personal security.'"

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at

24-25 (ellipsis in original)). Because the protections against searches of the person are
heightened, Terry searches must be limited to only pat downs of the outer layer of
clothing in order to avoid more severe intrusions of personal security without more
substantial and concrete justification for such an intrusion. 1o See Henage, 143 Idaho at
662; State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819-20 (2009).

In fact, the United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that Terry only
provides for "a limited search of outer clothing for weapons."
Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (emphasis added).

Arizona v. Lemon

Idaho courts have also

recognized this limitation of Terry searches. Henage, 143 Idaho at 661; In re Doe, 145
Idaho 980, 984 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that "an officer was justified in conducting a
Terry frisk of Doe's outer clothing for weapons" (emphasis added)). Such limitations are

necessary to prevent the Terry search from becoming a full search.11 See Robinson,
414 U.S. at 228.

10 However, the scope of the Terry search may be extended if there is reasonable and
articulable suspicion to so, based on a totality of the circumstances. See, e.g.,
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972); cf. Henage, 143 Idaho at 662 (defining
what constitutes such reasonable and articulable suspicion and holding that even the
admitted presence of a knife on the suspect is not enough to meet that standard absent
some articulable suspicion that the suspect is also currently dangerous).
11 Officer Arredondo had, in fact, already performed a full search on the driver of the
vehicle, based on that person's status as "on felony probation." (Tr., p.11, Ls.9-18.)
Officer Arredondo also admitted that when he went to search Mr. Tyler, he treated him
in the same way he had treated the driver. (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-10.) This suggests that
Officer Arredondo treated the full search and the Terry search as the same procedure,
which the State contests should be permissible. (See App. Br., pp7-12.) However,
accepting that perspective would eliminate the distinction that exists between full
searches and Terry searches, a result which would contradict both state and federal
precedent in this regard. See, e.g., Robinson, 414 U.S. at 228; Houghton, 526 U.S. at
303; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819-20.
12

Such a limitation restricting Terry searches to only pat downs of the outer layer of
clothing is coextensive with the "plain feel" doctrine, which is the rule that permits the
officer to seize the items felt under the suspect's outer layer of clothing during a Terry
search. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 50B U.S. 366, 375 (1993); Doe, 145 Idaho
at 9B4. "If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an
object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been
no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's
search for weapons .... " Dickerson, 50B U.S. at 375 (emphasis added); see also Doe,
145 Idaho at 9B4 (holding the same). Again, the courts reiterate that the scope of such
a search is limited to the suspect's outer clothing. Id.
Furthermore, manipulating the clothes for a better feel of the object located
during a Terry search is impermissible under the limited Terry exception to the warrant
requirement. See Dickerson, 50B U.S. at 37B; State v. Jeremy Johnson, 137 Idaho 656,
662 (Ct. App. 2002). However, the State misunderstood the manipulation analysis and
argued that, because the jackets were unzipped, the officer did not have to manipulate
them (i.e., unzip or unbutton them) in order to gain access the pocket where the syringe
was located. (App. Br., p.B.) Such a perspective is improper because, as Dickerson
and Jeremy Johnson recognize, the scope of this test is limited to what is permissible
under Terry (which is a pat down of the outer layer of clothes, see, e.g., Lemon
Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330). Therefore, the proper test for manipulation is whether the

officer created a situation that would allow him to try and better identify the object.
Dickerson, 50B U.S. at 37B; Jeremy Johnson, 137 Idaho at 662.
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In this case, Mr. Tyler's jackets covered the shirt pockets of his shirt. (Tr., p.36,
Ls.9-10 (Mr. Tyler testifying that he had to move his jacket so the officer could see the
pocket with the knife in it); p.31, Ls.1-4 (Officer Arredondo testifying that "[m]y hand was
under the jacket).) The only reasonable inference from this testimony is that the jackets
covered both pockets and it had to be moved out of the way in order to gain access to
the shirt pockets. As such, moving the clothes out of the way, even if only by placing a
hand between them and the target pocket, manipulates the clothes beyond what is
necessary for a weapons pat down and so violates the plain feel rule from Dickerson.
See Jeremy Johnson, 137 Idaho at 662; see also Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 369, 378
(holding the manipulation of the pocket of the defendant's jacket and the contents within
exceeded the scope of the Terry exception); United States v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187,
191 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that when officers conducted a proper Terry pat down of the
outer layer of clothing and in doing so, detected an item they identified as a potential
weapon, manipulating the concealing clothing to retrieve that item did not constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure).

Even in Terry itself, the United States Supreme

Court held that the officer was only permitted to reach into the breast pocket of the outer
jacket (much less the pocket of the shirt beneath that jacket, or the pocket of another
shirt beneath that) without first patting down the outer layer of clothing and identifying
the weapon through the outer layer.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 7, 29-30. The district court

recognized this distinction, articulated best in Thompson, and applied it to the facts at
hand.

In doing so, it found that Officer Arredondo had foregone a proper Terry pat

down, but implied that, had he performed one and still identified the syringe, the result
might be different. (See Tr., p.53, Ls.2- 9) However, because Officer Arredondo had
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not engaged in the proper Terry search first, his actions violated Mr. Tyler's state and
federal constitutional rights. (See Tr., p.53, Ls.21-25.)
Finally, the Terry exception is limited for the purpose of ensuring officer safety.
That justification, however, may not be used as an excuse to engage in an unlimited
search.

State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730-31 (Ct. App. 2005).

In so holding, the

Idaho Court of Appeals found the language and rationale from United States v. Miles to
be persuasive: '''It must also be remembered that the search took place while Miles
was handcuffed [behind his back]. Having already used significant force to secure the
scene for safety purposes,12 the officers cannot leverage the safety rationale into a
justification for a full-scale search.'"

Faith, 141 Idaho at 730-31 (quoting United

States v. Miles, 247 F.3d 1009, 1014-1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (brackets in original)).

Therefore, if the officers had already taken steps to ensure their safety at the scene, it
becomes less likely that the State will be able to justify a Terry search based on the
rationale of officer safety.
Similar to the situation in Miles, officers used significant force to secure the scene
in this case.

Officer Arredondo left his overhead lights activated throughout his

investigation. 13 (Tr., p.24, Ls.18-21.) He was joined by three other officers, meaning

12 In that case, the "significant force" constituted two officers approaching the suspect in
a shooting incident with their weapons drawn, having him kneel, and placing him in
handcuffs before conducting the pat down. Miles, 247 F.3d at 1011.
13 The use of the overhead lights by officers constitutes a show of authority, and if the
suspect submits to that show of authority, that is enough to establish a seizure of his
person for Fourth Amendment purposes. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 488-89
(2009). Therefore, the continuing use of the lights, combined with the fact that both
suspects submitted to the officer's authority, contributed to the officer's efforts to secure
the scene. See id.
15

there were twice as many officers present as suspects. 14 (Tr., p.10, Ls.8-9.) Officer
Arredondo had ordered the driver out of the vehicle, searched him (found nothing), and
had him move back to the police cruiser. (Tr., p.10, L.2 - p.12, L.9.) The officer then
had Mr. Tyler place his hands behind his back, with the fingers interlaced, so that the
officer could control them.1s (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-12.) Finally, Officer Arredondo had secured
the knife, removing it from Mr. Tyler's person, before engaging in the Terry search.
(Tr., p.36, L.25 - p.37, L.11, p.51, Ls.14-15.) With all these efforts to secure the scene
for officer safety (see, e.g., Tr., p.12, Ls.8-15), it is inappropriate to permit the State to
leverage the safety rationale to allow a full-scale search of Mr. Tyler. See Faith, 141
Idaho at 730-31; Miles, 247 F.3d at 1014-15.
This is true even though it is possible for a suspect to conceal small, potentially
offensive items underneath the outer layers of his clothing. See id; State v. Greene,
140 Idaho 605, 607-08 (Ct. App. 2004).

The State, however, contends that Terry

searches should be so expansive as to permit officers to engage in searches
"reasonably designed" to discover all hidden implements which might be used in an
attack upon the officer. (App. Br., p.7.) That interpretation, however, has already been
rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which recognized that, to allow Terry to be
expanded in such a manner, would cause there to be '''no limit to the bounds of a Terry
stop. Rather, looking for the proverbial 'needle in a haystack' would become the norm.

The presence of multiple officers is a factor which affects the show of force analysis
for purposes of determining the reasonableness of a detention, though it is not
dispositive. Stewart, 145 Idaho at 647. Therefore, the presence of multiple officers,
combined with both suspects' submission to the officer's show of authority, contributed
to their efforts to secure the scene. See id.
15 While they were not actually handcuffed, Mr. Tyler's hands were just as effectively
restrained by Officer Arredondo. Compare Miles, 247 F. 3d at 1014-15.
14
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'Shake, rattle, and roll' would take on new meaning in the context of a Terry patdown
[sic].'"

Faith, 141 Idaho at 731 (quoting Miles, 247 Idaho at 1015). Illustrating these

metaphors, in Greene, the officer observed the suspect apparently take something from
his right pocket with his left hand and put it in the crotch area of his pants. Greene, 140
Idaho at 606. The officer then shook the waistband of the suspect's pants to dislodge
the item. Id. at 607. The only reason the officer's search was permissible in that case
was that the officer had seen Mr. Greene try to conceal the object in his pants, and so
the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to engage in the more intrusive
search. 16 See id.
Contrarily, in this case, Officer Arredondo made no such observations with
regard to Mr. Tyler's right shirt pocket. In fact, he admitted that, not only did he not see
anything in the right shirt pocket, he did not see any indication of any item in the right
shirt pocket to draw his attention to the pocket (i.e., a bulge in the pocket consistent with
a weapon) before moving around behind Mr. Tyler to conduct his intrusive search.

This same distinction is true regarding all the examples the State cites in purported
support of its arguments. (See App. Br., pp.10-11.) In all those cases, there are
specific and articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion which justify the more
invasive search (i.e., lifting of a shirt or reaching into or manipulating the clothes), and
there are three generic ways in which the reasonable suspicion was established.
See, e.g., Adams, 407 U.S. at 147-48 (holding that, where an officer has reasonable
suspicion from surrounding the circumstances (i.e., from information provided by an
informant regarding the suspect's possession of a firearm), the more invasive search of
reaching into the suspect's clothing to secure the weapon did not violate Terry's
limitations); United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that,
where officers had reasonable suspicion after observing a bulge in the suspect's
clothing consistent with a concealed weapon, the more invasive search of lifting the
suspect's shirt without a pat down to secure that weapon did not violate Terry's
limitations); Thompson, 597 F.2d at 191 (holding that, where officers had reasonable
suspicion that an item detected through a proper pat down was, in fact, a weapon, the
more invasive search of reaching into the suspect's pocket to secure that object did not
violate Terry's limitations).
16
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(See Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.4.) And while he did order Mr. Tyler to stop reaching for

his pocket, both he and Mr. Tyler agree that statement was in regard to Mr. Tyler's
movements toward his left shirt pocket, where the knife was located. (Tr., p.30, Ls.1-11,
p.36, Ls.9-24.) Mr. Tyler explained that, due to the nervousness he was feeling as a
result of the situation, he foolishly tried to get the knife to surrender to the officer, but
that his actions were designed to cooperate with the investigation, not to harm the
officers.

(Tr., p.36, Ls.13-24.)

He also had initially told the officer that he was not

carrying weapons, but immediately corrected himself and volunteered the information
regarding the knife in his pocket. (Tr., p.47, Ls.1-2; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.)
While these actions by Mr. Tyler may have caused Officer Arredondo to be a little
apprehensive, the sequence of following events reveals that he had no articulable
suspicion that Mr. Tyler was carrying any weapons other than the knife:

Officer

Arredondo removed the knife from Mr. Tyler's pocket, and then asked Mr. Tyler whether
he could conduct a pat down.17 (Tr., p.51, Ls.13-15.) The test to determine whether a
search is permissible under Terry is an objective test looking at the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that the
suspect posed a risk of danger (i.e., they were '''armed and presently dangerous"').
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). Once the potential weapon is

secured by officers, the reasonable suspicion arising from that object is extinguished for
purposes of a Terry frisk, since there is no longer a need to fear the suspect will be able
to use that item against the officer. See Faith, 141 Idaho at 730-31; see also Henage,

17 This was a finding of fact made by the district court as to the series of events,
and that conclusion was reasonably drawn from the evidence in the record. (Tr., p.36,
L.25 - p.37, L.11; 51, Ls.14-15.) Therefore, this Court should defer to that finding. Diaz,
144 Idaho at 302; Stewart, 145 Idaho at 649.
18

143 Idaho at 662 (noting that, even if the suspect admits to having a knife on his
person, the officer must still be able to point to some articulable fact that causes him
to have reasonable suspicion that the suspect actually poses a threat to the officer's
safety before he may engage in a Terry search). This is because "[t]he sole justification
of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others
nearby.... " Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. Therefore, if the officer has no reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous, the sole
justification is not present, and thus, the exception does not apply. See id.; Bishop, 146
Idaho at 818; Henage, 143 Idaho at 662.
Officer Arredondo admitted that he did not see anything in the right shirt pocket
that drew his attention. 18 (Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.24, L.4.) In fact, he did not testify to the
existence of any facts demonstrating that Mr. Tyler posed a potential threat to him or the
other officers, besides his reference to the fact that in vehicle search situations, leaving
suspects in the vehicle can create a security risk. (See Tr., pp.6-31, p.12, Ls.13-15.)
As such, he had no reasonable or articulable suspicion that Mr. Tyler had any weapons
beside the X-acto knife or that Mr. Tyler still presented a potential threat, especially
once he had secured the knife. Compare Henage, 143 Idaho at 662 (holding that, even
though the suspect admitted to having a knife on his person, the officer did not identify
any fact that demonstrated the suspect presented a potential threat, and therefore,
the search was not justified under Terry); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819-20 (holding that,

18 Had he seen something, like a bulge, that was consistent with a weapon, then he
might have had the necessary reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Hill, 545 F.2d at 1193.
However, since he saw nothing, there were no specific, articulable facts upon which
Officer Arredondo could have based a reasonable suspicion that a weapon might be in
the right shirt pocket. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.
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although the officer felt threatened by the general atmosphere of the situation, there
were no objective, articulable facts to support his conclusion that the suspect posed a
threat to him, and therefore, the search was not justified under Terry). Therefore, as in
Henage and Bishop, the more intrusive search of Mr. Tyler was not justified under
Terry. See id.

As such, Officer Arredondo was required to limit his search to a pat down of
Mr. Tyler's outer clothing. Had he felt and immediately identified the syringe through the
multiple layers, only then would he have been able to reach under the jackets to the
right shirt pocket without violating the state and federal constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30; Dickerson, 508 U.S.
at 378; Hen age , 143 Idaho at 661; Jeremy Johnson, 137 Idaho at 662; Faith, 141 Idaho
at 730-31; Thompson, 597 F.2d at 191.

The district court properly understood and

applied this standard to these facts. (Tr., p.51, L.17 - p.52, L.24.) Officer Arredondo did
not engage in the necessary, limited initial pat down of Mr. Tyler's outer layer of
clothing.

(Tr., p.52, L.25 - p.53, L.9.) As such, the district court properly held that

Officer Arredondo exceeded both the scope of Mr. Tyler's consent and the scope of the
Terry exception, and, in doing so, violated Mr. Tyler's state and federal constitutional

rights against unreasonable and warrantless searches. (Tr., p.53, Ls.1-25.) Therefore,
its decision that the evidence should be suppressed should be affirmed by this Court.
(See Tr., p.54, Ls.2-3.)
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Tyler respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's ruling.
DATED this 8 th day of March, 2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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